



THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES OF 1787 
AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES  
 
 





The choices made in the creation of a constitution have immediate political results and, 
often enough, lasting economic consequences. That, at least, is the overall thesis of this 
book, which examines the economic significance of the Federal Constitution drafted at 
Philadelphia in the late spring and summer of 1787. The Constitution occupies so large 
a place in our collective understanding of American history and politics and is so vital a 
symbol of national identity that it is difficult to recall that the American federal republic 
might easily have evolved along alternative paths. Of course, it is well known that some 
matters were hotly contested in 1787, such as the disputes over representation that 
dominated the first seven weeks of debate at Philadelphia, and that others, notably the 
absence of a declaration of fundamental rights, became objects of public controversy as 
soon as the Constitution was submitted to a sovereign people for ratification. But to 
emphasize the big dramatic issues – the purported “great compromise” over 
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representation, the assuaging of Anti-Federalist doubts with the proposal of a “bill of 
rights” – is still only to confirm what a heroic episode it all was. Other contingent choices 
that set the Convention on its course, or that gave the Constitution its essential ability to 
endure, remain obscure. 
  In this paper, we treat three interrelated issues involving the constitutional 
choices of 1787. First, we examine various defects of the Articles of Confederation, 
including basic institutional failures and their consequences for public policy.  Several 
features of the Articles made enforcement of federal measures virtually impossible, and 
thus hindered the capacity of the national government to adapt to unforeseen 
circumstances. An array of crises emerged under this political system, many associated 
with states that had incentives to shirk their federal obligations and pursue their self 
interest at the expense of the common good. The lack of reliable and independent 
sources of revenue left the national government financially dependent on the states. 
Similar problems emerged in other policy domains: foreign relations, internal trade 
barriers, and paper money. Congress under the Articles also failed to solve other 
problems, such as enforcing the Treaty of Paris, the British closure of its Caribbean 
ports to American ships, and asserting control over the western frontier. Retiring the 
public debt and establishing public credit remained major difficulties. Even as these 
problems became clear, the Article’s institutional constraints prevented their resolution. 
The unanimity rule necessary to revise the Articles rendered amendment and hence 
adaptation of its institutions impossible. Try as they might, advocates of greater powers 
for the national government could not convince every state to go along.   
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  Second, we emphasize that the dramatic paradigm shift inherent in the adoption 
of the Constitution—from a federal union premised on the voluntary compliance of the 
states with federal measures to one in which two governments would each act legally 
on their common citizenry—was not inevitable. Instead, it was one choice among many. 
The Founders could easily have followed a less risky strategy by proposing more limited 
though still significant adjustments within the framework of the Articles. That they did not 
ultimately pursue this path reflects their understanding of the Articles’ failures and the 
drastic change needed in any future constitutional solution. Equally important, the 
framers’ success was not inevitable. Institutional innovations incorporated into the 
Federal Constitution of 1787 were new and untested. Although it is easy for us to 
believe that more than two centuries of relative political stability means that success 
was inevitable, the history of previous confederations and republics suggests 
otherwise.
1 A stable republican constitution capable of governing a society as large as 
the United States, for example, had never existed. 
  Finally, we examine how the Constitution’s features allowed Americans both to 
solve the wide range of policy problems and to adapt policy and institutions as 
circumstances required. The new Constitution had effects on policies on two levels: 
directly, reflecting the national government’s addressing various problems under its new 
authority; and indirectly reflecting the states acting to address other problems within the 
                                                           
1   In making this claim, we do not of course overlook the dark and bloody ground of the Civil War or the major 
shift in federal relations to which it led. But we see that conflict not as a constitutional failure per se, but rather as a 
crisis rooted in two fundamentally incompatible visions of the nature and value of the federal Union itself  
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context of the newly created market-preserving federalism.
2  For our purposes, two of 
the most important institutional innovations include the replacement of the unicameral 
consultative Continental Congress by a true bicameral legislature; and the shift toward a 
centralized federalism to replace the decentralized system of the Confederation.
3  In 
contrast to the Articles, the new constitutional system proved remarkably adaptable, 
allowing the nation to confront new challenges. As an illustration of both the successes 
and limitations of this system, we discuss the persistent problem of slavery in the 
antebellum years. 
  This paper proceeds as follows. In part I, we reconstruct the larger realm of 
constitutional choice that shaped the deliberations of 1787, and then reflect on the 
lasting significance for American economic development of key decisions that were 
taken. In part II, we turn to the consequences of the Constitution, both direct and 
indirect. This discussion begins with the new policies chosen to address the various 
policy dilemmas under the Articles, turns to the consequences of the new centralized 
federalism, and then ends with the long-term consequences of the ability to adapt, 




                                                           
2 Market-preserving federalism is a type of federalism that places states in competition 
with one another in the context of policy and tax authority over local public goods while 
requiring them to face the financial consequences of their decisions (i.e., the so-called 
hard budget constraint); see Weingast (1995).  
 
3 Riker (1987) describes the American invention of centralized federalism in 1787.  
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Part I: The Road to Philadelphia 
 
Once past the opening words of the preamble, the Constitution is a prosaic text. Most of 
its clauses are devoted to allocating different powers and duties among the great 
departments of government, sketching the relationship and boundaries between 
national and state governments, describing the modes of appointment of particular 
officers, and detailing their terms of service. Yet the larger enterprise of constitution-
making cannot be wholly reduced to the sum of these provisions. Or rather, these 
provisions, properly construed, illuminate the multiple dimensions of the American 
constitutional project of the late 1780s. Four dimensions deserve particular notice. 
  First, the immediate occasion for the calling of the Convention was the perceived 
need to establish a new framework within which key public policy and public goods 
problems of the 1780s could be adequately addressed and satisfactorily resolved. 
Those problems were primarily consequences of the war for independence and the 
immediate aftermath of the treaty of peace  (Edling 2003; Marks, 1986; Rakove, 1979). 
  A short list of these specific policy concerns include at least the following: 
  providing the national government with independent and reliable sources of 
revenue to meet its basic expenses; 
 
  funding or retiring the public debt accrued during the war, thereby enabling the 
United States to have future access to credit markets both at home but especially 
abroad; 
 
  developing effective strategies for responding to the twin economic threats to 
postwar prosperity: the flooding of American markets with European goods, and 




  enforcing key provisions of the Treaty of Paris relating to the rights of British 
creditors seeking payment of prewar debts and loyalists seeking recovery of 
confiscated estates; and 
 
  securing effective control of the new national domain above the Ohio River and 
maintaining the political loyalty of trans-Appalachian settlers more generally, 
especially after Spain closed the Mississippi River to American navigation in 
1784. 
 
Many of these problems stemmed from the incentives of states to shirk their duties 
rather than cooperate. Insufficient coercive power under the Articles led to shirking by 
the states. States, for example, faced free-rider incentives to limit their tax collection for 
the national government. The national government had no means to ensure cooperation 
or to punish states that shirked. Similar problems arose in other areas, such as honoring 
treating obligations, internal trade barriers, and paper money.  
  Together, these five clusters of issues defined the issue space within which 
questions of public goods and public policy began to converge with issues of 
constitutional authority and institutional design. Absent these specific concerns, there 
would have been no occasion for anything like the Federal Convention to be held. But 
even with them, the putative reformers favoring a stronger federal union had to ask 
whether their optimal strategy was one of piecemeal amendment or wholesale revision 
of the Articles of Confederation. Until early 1786, political prudence favored the idea of 
gradual change; by the close of the year, political desperation tipped the calculation 
toward comprehensive change. Yet had the delegates who straggled into Philadelphia 
in May 1787 acted more cautiously, many contemporaries would have applauded their 
good judgment in not making the best the enemy of the good.  
 7
A second major dimension of the constitution-making project of the late 1780s is 
that it involved a substantial rethinking of the republican assumptions that informed the 
drafting, a decade earlier, of both the initial state constitutions that replaced the ancien 
regime of colonial government and the Articles of Confederation. This rethinking is what 
gives the constitutional debates of 1787-1788–both the deliberations at Philadelphia and 
the broader public discussion that followed–their dramatic character and intellectual 
significance. To draft the Constitution and to secure its ratification, the framers and their 
Federalist supporters had to challenge basic premises under which the revolutionaries 
had acted a decade earlier (Wood, 1969). Part of that challenge was directed, of 
course, to such classic questions as the optimal size of republics or the degree of virtue 
necessary to their preservation. But a substantial part focused on basic matters of 
institutional competence and constitutional design–to the real stuff, that is, of the 
practical constitution-making enterprise. 
  Third, that enterprise was also a negotiated compact among a pre-existing set of 
established polities. Whether the original states are better described as fully sovereign 
entities or, more narrowly, as autonomous jurisdictions for purposes of internal 
governance, their delegates at Philadelphia and the subsequent ratification conventions 
did not operate behind any veil of political ignorance when it came to assessing how 
adoption of the Constitution might affect vital interests. The Convention’s compromises 
over the composition and election of the political branches were only the most obvious 
examples of the bargaining process that went into constitution-making. The Constitution 
also operated as a mutual security pact among the existing states, sharply limiting their  
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capacity to threaten each other militarily. Equally important, the Constitution also 
collectively assured the territorial integrity of the states against separatist movements 
within their claimed boundaries (Onuf 1983, Hendrickson, 2003). 
But, in the fourth place, those states–or rather, their governments–were no 
longer the sole or even primary parties to the federal compact being re-negotiated. Nor 
was the Constitution simply an agreement to be promulgated by a group of dignitaries 
once they had resolved all the questions their deliberations had raised. For the 
Constitution to become fully constitutional, it also had to be ratified by the people 
themselves, acting through popularly elected conventions in each of the states. The 
relative ease with which this new rule of ratification was adopted and applied, and the 
Federalist success in restricting the true decisions of these conventions to up-or-down 
votes on the Constitution in its entirety, guaranteed that the new system of government 
would begin its operation with a remarkable measure of legitimacy (Rakove, 1996; 
Simeres, 2002). As passionately as Americans would soon begin debating the meaning 
of particular clauses, their disputes never denied the legitimacy of the constitutional 
revolution of 1787-1788. That was not an outcome that could have been taken 
completely for granted when the movement for constitutional reform risked the calling of 
a general convention, or even after the luminaries at Philadelphia finished their work.  
  To survey these multiple facets of constitution-making is to identify one final 
aspect of the great enterprise of 1787. No obvious, transparent agenda was destined or 
pre-determined for the Convention to pursue; but instead a range of possible outcomes 
existed among which choices had to be made. The otherwise rich documentary record  
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of the debates of 1787-1789 is strikingly thin when it comes to knowing what either the 
delegates themselves or the American public initially expected the Convention to 
accomplish. The one great exception to this is the evidence we have for James 
Madison’s preparations for Philadelphia; and given his key role in setting its agenda, 
that evidence goes far toward explaining why the Convention took the course it did.
1  
  Even so, it is important to stress that multiple paths of constitutional reform were 
available in 1787. The Convention could have easily pursued a more prudent path. Nor 
should one forget that the logic of radical reform in 1787 also rested on the perceived 
“imbecility” of the Articles of Confederation, especially as manifested in the absurd rule 
requiring the unanimous approval of the state legislatures for its amendment. Had any 
of the amendments to the Confederation previously proposed surmounted that obstacle, 
the case for an extraordinary plenary convention might never have been made, much 
less prevailed at that time. The American Union could then have evolved along any 
number of counterfactual paths. But the fact remains, the contingencies of historical 
action did break one way, not another, and fundamental choices were made. Not least 
among them was the decision to abandon the framework of the Confederation and to 





                                                           
1  See Rakove (1996 chapter 3); but for a characteristically provocative and perverse 
dissent on just this point, counterfactual. McDonald (1985, 205).  
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THE INITIAL AGENDA OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
  Drafted in 1776-77, the Articles of Confederation reflected the dominant 
republican assumptions that also shaped the first state constitutions. Overall 
coordination of the struggle for independence belonged to Congress; the states would 
implement its decisions, acting not as sovereign judges of the propriety of its 
resolutions, but as administrative auxiliaries with superior knowledge of local conditions 
and the representative political authority to rule by law. This understanding accorded 
well with American experience. Governance in colonial America had always been highly 
decentralized; the authority of the empire never penetrated into the countryside; and 
there was no national administrative apparatus to speak of. Congress itself was a badly 
undermanned institution. Its members typically served some months during a yearly 
term or two before insisting that others bear the burden of long absences from home 
and family. It made completely good sense to expect the states to do the real work of 
mobilizing the country’s resources for war.
2 
  This expectation that the states would strive to do their duty also rested, Madison 
rightly recalled, “on a mistaken confidence that the justice, the good faith, the honor, the 
sound policy, of the several legislative assemblies would render superfluous any appeal 
to the ordinary motives by which the laws secure the obedience of individuals” (Madison 
1787). The first American federalism was thus grounded on the public-spirited values of 
                                                           
2 Which is not to say that all states were equally competent in mobilizing those 
resources. See the provocative comparison of the capacities of northern and southern 
states in Einhorn (2006). The best single study of how an individual state went about 
complying with federal measures is Richard Buel, Dear Liberty: Connecticut’s 
Mobilization for the Revolutionary War (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1980).  
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republicanism, and those values were sorely tested by the duration of a bitterly fought 
war and the enormous strain it placed on both the capacity of the states and the virtue 
of their citizens. 
  By 1780 the discouraging results of this test were apparent. Such efforts as the 
states made to levy taxes were clearly inadequate to meet the open-ended demands of 
the war. One response to this continuing shortfall was to rely on the customary methods 
of currency finance, printing money and trying to withdraw it from circulation before it 
depreciated too badly. But depreciation occurred regardless, and in 1779, with the 
specie value of the continental dollar falling to 20:1. In that year, Congress took the 
painful decision, first to stop printing money, and then to adopt a new requisitioning 
system of “specific supplies” to be demanded from particular states (Rakove, 1979). 
The fits and starts of that conversion, compounded by the worst snowfalls in decades, 
made the winter of 1780 the absolute nadir of the war effort. 
  It was also the moment from which we can date the emergence of the reformist 
impulses that ultimately led to the Federal Convention of 1787. Perhaps it is only a 
symbolic coincidence that Madison entered Congress in March 1780, or that a few 
months later Alexander Hamilton drafted the mini-treatise on political economy (as a 
letter to New York delegate James Duane) that first exhibited his keen financial 
intelligence. More noteworthy is the fact that members of the national political elite 
already recognized that the still unratified Articles of Confederation were inadequate to 
the real problems of governance the war had exposed. Thus even as Congress worked  
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to bring Maryland, the last holdout, to end its dissent, delegates like Madison were 
already contemplating the amendments needed to give Congress adequate authority. 
  After Maryland ratified the Confederation early in 1781, Congress quickly sent its 
first amendment to the states, requesting permission to levy a 5% impost on foreign 
imports, meant not as a source of operating revenue but as security against which 
Congress might attract foreign loans. Congress also appointed Robert Morris as its first 
(and only) superintendent of finance. Amid his heroic labors in keeping the Continental 
Army in the field in advance of the decisive victory at Yorktown, Morris found time to 
begin drafting a comprehensive program to secure adequate revenues and establish 
public credit. When Rhode Island effectively killed the impost in 1781, the Morris 
program to vest Congress with authority to levy land, poll, and excise taxes became the 
basis for months of sharp debate and political maneuvers. To pressure Congress to 
adopt his program, Morris attempted to mobilize public creditors throughout the states 
while exploiting unrest in the army. Morris overplayed his hand, however, and eventually 
lost the support of a key bloc of delegates who joined Madison in promoting a 
compromise measure. The states would be asked to assign permanent revenues of 
their own choosing to Congress; a new impost would be proposed; and the unwieldy 
formula of the Confederation for apportioning the common expenses of the Union on the 
basis of the assessed value of improved land would be replaced by a simple population 
rule (with slaves counting as three fifths of free persons). This was the basis for the 
package of resolutions that Congress sent to the states on April 18, 1783, and it marked 
the first major component of the agenda of federal constitutional reform.   
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  Over the course of the next year, two other sets of issues emerged to enlarge the 
potential agenda for constitutional reform. One was concerned with the dual crises that 
afflicted American commerce in the first year of peace, when scores of British ships 
entered American harbors, bringing imported goods war-deprived consumers were all 
too happy to purchase, to the detriment of local artisans, while London simultaneously 
barred American merchantmen from imperial harbors, most importantly in the West 
Indies, the traditional market for American agricultural surpluses. A second set of issues 
had to do with the effective governance and political control of the trans-Appalachian 
interior. Above the Ohio River, Congress gained title to a national domain established 
through the voluntary cessions of states claiming interior lands. Its ability to develop this 
land, however, was threatened by several factors: the free flow of squatter-settlers into 
southern Ohio, opposition from indigenous peoples who were surprised to learn that 
they had just been defeated in the Revolutionary war, and the retention by the British of 
frontier forts from which they could encourage resident tribes to resist American 
expansion. Below the Ohio, the future states of Kentucky and Tennessee were still part 
of Virginia and North Carolina, respectively; but settlers there were deeply troubled by 
the Spanish decision to prohibit the trans-shipment of American produce through New 
Orleans into the Gulf of Mexico. If Congress could not find a way to relax the Spanish 
choke-hold, the loyalty of these settlers would be up for grabs, and the United States 
might forfeit the generous territorial settlement it had gained in the peace negotiations of 
1782 and 1783.  
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  In April 1784 Congress responded to the first set of issues by asking the states to 
approve two additional amendments to the Confederation. Stopping well short of 
recommending a plenary power to regulate foreign trade, these proposals would have 
empowered Congress to retaliate against nations that discriminated against American 
merchants. In dealing with the new national domain, Congress adopted a land 
ordinance (forerunner to the Northwest Ordinance of 1787) that anticipated the eventual 
admission to the Union of a number of new states, on essential conditions of equality 
with its original members. That was a visionary statement of a core constitutional 
principle of state equality, and one which promised that the interior of the continent 
would not be developed as internal colonies of the older societies on the seaboard. But 
the greater challenge Congress faced in the west stemmed from its inability to project 
national power beyond the Appalachians. Without the resources to maintain armed 
force in the Ohio Valley, there was little chance that Congress could overawe either 
squatter-settlers or the Indians they were antagonizing, much less induce Spain to open 
the Mississippi to American navigation. 
  In the end, then, it all (or mostly) came down to revenue, and from 1783 to 1786, 
that prospect in turn depended on unanimous state acceptance of the package of 
amendments Congress had proposed in April 1783. The basic obstacle to reform 
remained the unanimity rule of the Confederation, a rule predicated in part on the belief 
that the states were quasi-sovereign jurisdictions, but also fortified by the perception 
that republican convictions of the public good should make consensus attainable. 
Whether decisions about essential public goods should require that high a degree of  
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agreement was the great question that the mid-decade constitutional stalemate left 
unresolved. Insofar as the failure to attain unanimity challenged core republican 
assumptions, the stringent rule of amendment worked to make calculations of interest 
rather than appeals to virtue the denominator of American politics. The unanimity rule of 
the Articles greatly limited the ability of Americans to adapt to new circumstances and to 
adjust their institutions as practice diverged from expectations. 
 
MADISON’S AGENDA 
  Taken individually or collectively, none of these measures portended a radical 
shift in the character or structure of the Confederation. Well into 1785, the agenda of 
constitutional reform remained gradualist, not radical. All of the powers being 
considered could be vested in the same unicameral body that had governed national 
affairs since 1774. Nationally-minded politicians hoped that the specter of an “imbecile” 
Congress (as it was often disparaged) and the bite of commercial depression would 
somehow enable Americans to recognize that an assembly appointed by their own state 
legislatures did not pose the same dangers as a distant Parliament once had. 
  For this strategy to succeed, however, success had to begin somewhere, and in 
practice the unanimity rule of the Confederation made its amendment impossible. As 
the nation seemed to sink into commercial depression by 1785, a committee of 
Congress, led by James Monroe, drafted yet another amendment giving Congress the 
sole power “of regulating the trade of the States, as well with foreign Nations, as with 
each other,” including authority to levy “such imposts and duties upon imports and  
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exports, as may be necessary for the purpose,” with the resulting revenues accruing to 
the states in which they were collected. But with the previous amendments still in limbo, 
it seemed pointless to add a fresh one to the queue.    
  These issues of revenue and public credit, foreign commerce, and control of the 
interior remained the great national questions. But within the states, other developments 
were taking place that would ultimately lead to a significant expansion in the agenda of 
constitutional reform. The most important of these concerned efforts by individual states 
to retire their own public debts and to remove the financial detritus of the war. That 
involved imposing higher levels of taxation than an exhausted population was inclined to 
favor, and amid the depressed economic conditions of the mid-1780s, calls for tax and 
debtor relief and the issuance of paper money were hardly surprising. land. As these 
demands mounted, and as the politics of individual states–notably Rhode Island–came 
under the sway of pro-paper money factions, stalwart defenders of basic property rights 
persuaded themselves that the republic was endangered by what we might call 
economic populism avant le fait. If the advocates of paper money prevailed now, they 
worried, who could guarantee that the American people might not come to favor a 
confiscatory redistribution of other forms of wealth as well, even an Agrarian law 
modeled on the precedent of Roman antiquity and a radical strain in modern republican 
thinking that ran from More and Machiavelli to Harrington and Locke and even, perhaps, 
to Jefferson
 (Holton, 2007; Nelson, 2004). 
  No one was more alarmed over these developments than Madison, and in our 
view, his key role in shaping the ultimate agenda of constitutional reform makes close  
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attention to his developing views a key element in any account of what happened in 
1787. There is no question that a brooding concern over the security of the rights of 
creditors and landowners helped inspire Madison’s efforts to rethink the basic premises 
of republican government (Rakove 1996). Scholars who equate his originality as a 
constitutional thinker solely with the “extended republic” and “ambition counteracting 
ambition” hypotheses of Federalist 10 and 51 overlook the extent to which the real 
source of his creative insights lay in his acute analysis of the institutional workings and 
defective outputs of state legislatures. Two years of service in the Virginia assembly, 
after he had been term-limited out of Congress in 1783, turned Madison into a keen 
student of the science of legislation, especially as that applied science was practiced, 
not by the all-wise “lawgiver” of Enlightenment philosophy, but by rustic provincials who 
were prone to error and all too responsive to the parochial concerns of their 
constituents. By August 1785 he was convinced that the crying need of republican 
government within the states was to find ways to “give wisdom and steadiness to 
legislation.” This need was closely tied to his emerging recognition, as he would state it 
in Federalist 10, that “The regulation of these various and interfering [economic] 
interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party 
and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.”  From this 
concern evolved the critical conviction that no solution to the problems of federalism 
would be complete that did not reach the matter of legislative misrule within the states.  
  Whether that concern would ever become the basis for action, however, 
depended on the uncertain fate of the amendments of 1783 and 1784. In late January  
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1786 the Virginia legislature invited other states to join it in sending delegates to a 
special convention to consider the nation’s commercial woes. Though Madison was 
initially a reluctant supporter of this scheme, he soon concluded that this meeting 
offered a more promising path to constitutional reform than adherence to the rules of the 
Confederation. From his correspondent James Monroe, he knew that Congress was 
considering yet another set of amendments to the Articles. But believing that Congress 
itself was too politically discredited to be an agent of its own transformation, Madison 
agreed that other steps were necessary. 
  Had the eventual Annapolis convention of September 1786 been better attended, 
it might have framed a new and more expansive amendment vesting broad commercial 
powers in Congress, akin, perhaps, to the recommendation Monroe’s committee had 
prepared in 1785, or to similar proposals that were presented to Congress in the 
summer of 1786.  But the dozen commissioners from five states who quaffed a few 
tankards at Mann’s Tavern in mid-September 1786 were too small a gathering to 
propose anything of their own authority. Rather than adjourn empty-handed, however, 
they seized upon a clause in the credentials for the New Jersey deputies and proposed 
instead that a new meeting be held at Philadelphia the following May. That call was 
eventually heeded by every state except Rhode Island and endorsed by Congress as 
well. 
  In the winter and early spring of 1787, Madison set about preparing a working 
agenda for the Philadelphia meeting. Much has been written about the extent to which 
this course of reading and reflection led him to hypothesize that a large diverse republic  
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might better resist the “mischiefs of faction” than the small, homogeneous nurseries of 
disinterested civic virtue beloved of traditional republican theorists. But for purposes of 
framing an agenda for action, other aspects of Madison’s reflections and preparations 
appear more consequential. 
  First, and arguably most important, Madison concluded that any system of 
federalism grounded on the voluntary compliance of the state governments with national 
measures was doomed to failure.
4 As independent jurisdictions, the interests of the 
states were too disparate, and their politics too prone to manipulation by “courtiers of 
popularity,” to be expected to comply regularly and enthusiastically with the 
recommendations of a toothless Congress. Even when their interests should coincide, 
doubts about their mutual good faith in fulfilling federal obligations would discourage 
active compliance. It followed that the national government had to be empowered to 
operate as all true governments do, with constitutional authority to enact, administer, 
and adjudicate its own laws, which would apply directly to citizens and involve the state 
governments as little as possible. That in turn meant replacing the unicameral 
Continental Congress with a bicameral legislature while also creating a constitutionally 
independent executive and judiciary. (Here is where the lessons to be drawn from the 
experience of republican government in the states would prove most salient.) 
  Second, Madison’s rich critique of the “Vices of the Political System of the U. 
States” (1787) indicted the shortcomings of state-based politics on additional grounds. 
States were defaulting on their federal duties in other ways: by arrogating congressional 
                                                           
4 As mentioned earlier, Madison clearly perceived the commitment problem at the heart 
of state shirking.  “A distrust of the voluntary compliance of each other may prevent the  
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authority; violating international treaty obligations (especially by obstructing British 
creditors seeking recovery of pre-war debts); trespassing on each other’s rights (his 
leading example being the designation of paper money as legal tender); and by showing 
a “want of concert in matters where common interest requires it,” a “defect [that] is  
strongly illustrated in the state of our commercial affairs” (Madison: Writings, 69-71). 
Implicit in this list of criticisms was the idea that constitutional reform had to extend 
beyond the principal purpose of making the Union independent of the states. It required 
as well an effort to curtail the authority of the states themselves, especially as their 
residual sovereignty constrained the pursuit of national objects or the harmony of 
interstate relations. 
  Third, Madison’s analysis extended to the internal vicissitudes of state policy, or 
what he called the “multiplicity,” “mutability,” “injustice,” and “impotence” of state 
lawmaking. It would not be enough, he concluded, to restrict the states from 
jeopardizing the pursuit and attainment of common interests. It was also essential to 
check their legislative excesses, to provide a federal remedy, through a congressional 
negative on state laws, that could check the factious forces swirling through state 
politics. That negative could be deployed defensively, to block the states from adopting 
measures that threatened federal policies and national interests. But it could also be 
used for interventionist purposes, to protect individuals and minorities against the unjust 
or ill-considered laws that dominant majorities were likely to adopt. And there is no 
question that the class of legislation that most worried, indeed obsessed Madison was 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
compliance of any, although it should be the latent disposition of all” (Madison, 1787).  
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the quasi-populist, anti-creditor, pro-relief measures that various states had either 
adopted or were still discussing (Rakove, 1996; Holton, 2007). 
  Fourth, all of Madison’s concerns at this critical moment rested on a perception 
that the future politics of the republic would pivot around efforts by interests–whether 
defined in terms of communities, classes, or occupations–to exploit the positive 
lawmaking authority of both state and national governments for their own purposes. 
Today this seems like a truism, and wholly unsurprising. But in the eighteenth century, 
the reigning political ideology viewed representative assemblies first and foremost as 
checking institutions, not as the adaptive and preference-aggregating forums they were 
in the process of becoming. Madison, by contrast, had developed an acutely modern 
notion of legislation. Drawing in part on the experience of wartime governance, but 
accurately foreseeing the more active use of legislative power in an age of economic 
development and improvement, he was deeply concerned with promoting the proper 
use of legislative power. In the states, where the bulk of economic regulation would still 
take place, it was important to guard against the dominance of factious, self-interested 
majorities. At the national level, however, it might be possible, through the refining 
mechanisms of election and deliberation, to promote a more considered, less impulsive 
understanding of the “public good.” His notion of what the particular public goods 
comprising the broader public good of res publica might consist of was probably less 
expansive or complex than that of his northern counterparts, particularly his current ally 
and future rival, Alexander Hamilton. But the idea of improving the quality of legislative 
deliberation through the election of a superior class of representatives was premised on  
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the belief that republican governments would be active governments capable of 




  In the eight months between the Annapolis and Philadelphia conventions, there 
must have been many private conversations about the potential agenda for 
constitutional reform. It was “not uncommon,” treasury commissioner Samuel Osgood 
wrote John Adams, to hear the principles of Government stated in common 
Conversation. Emperors, Kings, Stadtholders, Governors General, with a Senate, or 
House of lords, & House of Commons, are frequently the Topics of Conversation.” 
Some favor “abolishing all the state Governments” and “establishing some Kind of 
general Government,” Osgood added, “but I believe very few agree in the general 
Principles; much less in the Details of such a Government” (Rakove 1979,387). Absent 
a pre-Convention planning conference in which proto-Federalist notables could have 
mapped strategy, and given the lack of published speculation as to what the Convention 
might do, the extent to which Madison’s own preparations ultimately mattered in 
shaping the agenda of discussion becomes more evident. Short of abolishing the states 
outright, or impracticably trying to equalize their net influence by a creative redrawing of 
state boundaries, it is difficult to conceive how anyone could have fashioned a more 
expansive agenda than Madison worked out in the roughly two months preceding the 
appointed meeting day of May 14.  
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  Having issued the original invitation to Philadelphia, the Virginians were punctual 
about attending. The same could not be said for the other delegations. While waiting for 
their arrival, the Virginians crafted the fifteen articles that Governor Edmund Randolph 
introduced as the Virginia Plan on May 29. In contrast to all prior discussions of 
constitutional reform, which had focused on the specific additional powers the Union 
was deemed to need, the Virginia Plan was far more concerned with structure than 
authority. Article 6 would empower the new bicameral legislature “to legislate in all 
cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the 
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation” (Farrand 
1966 I, 21). Although it is possible that the Virginians really did intend to vest a future 
congress with this kind of plenary power, it seems more likely that this formula was 
meant to serve as a placeholder whose contents would be specified later, once the 
great disputes over representation that consumed the first seven weeks of debate were 
resolved. Madison’s political strategy was to insist that the Convention must first agree 
that representation in both houses of the legislature had to be proportioned to 
population, and that the quantum of power the large states would be willing to vest in 
the new government depended on the satisfactory resolution of this issue.  
  That strategy held even after William Paterson proposed the New Jersey Plan in 
mid-June. Although this plan’s provisions were more reminiscent of the kinds of reforms 
that had been discussed over the past few years, this alternative scheme proved a brief 
distraction from the debates over representation. Once the New Jersey Plan was 
dispatched, the convention spent another four weeks trying to solve the representation  
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conundrum. The basic story is familiar to every schoolchild: A good compromise was 
finally struck allowing the fearful small states to preserve an equal vote in the Senate, 
while an evil but perhaps necessary bargain enabled the slaveholding states of the 
South to count their human chattel for purposes of representation. Often overlooked in 
this moral calculus is the reality that slavery was the real, material, palpable interest that 
had to be accommodated if a lasting inter-sectional Union was to be created, and with it 
the benefits of economic integration the Constitution was intended to promote. The 
ostensible conflict between small and large states, by contrast, was ephemeral and 
false, since the size of the state in which one works and votes has never identified an 
actual interest deserving or requiring promotion (Rakove 1996, 57-93). 
  Once the twin issues of representation were resolved in mid-July, the delegates 
were finally free to turn their attention to what they actually wanted the government to 
do. That task was entrusted to the committee of detail that met during the ten-day 
adjournment from July 26 to August 6. Its report marked the point at which the open-
ended grant of legislative power in the Virginia Plan began to be transformed into the 
enumerated Article I, Section 8 powers of the final draft. 
  Once the Convention took up the committee’s proposals, the ensuing 
disagreements on matters of substance were few. Vesting Congress with the power to 
levy and collect taxes and regulate foreign and interstate commerce were foregone 
conclusions. On economic matters, the two main sticking points were the prohibition of 
taxes on exports and the proposal that navigation acts–laws regulating foreign 
commerce–require two-thirds majorities in both houses. There were some sharp  
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exchanges on both points, but the convention found little difficulty in treating the 
retention of the prohibition as a concession to the commodity-exporting states of the 
South and eliminating the two-thirds requirement as a fair bargain with the commercial 
North.  
  One other matter would prove a source of significant controversy after the 
Constitution was ratified. On August 18 Madison included among a list of further 
legislative powers to be considered the power “To grant charters of incorporation in 
cases where the Public good may require them, and the authority of a single State may 
be incompetent.” That same day, Charles Pinckney proposed a simpler version of the 
same power, dropping Madison’s qualifying phrases (Farrand 1966, II, 325). When the 
committee of detail and the committee on postponed parts failed to report a suitable 
clause, Madison renewed his motion on September 14, three days before the 
Convention adjourned. After brief debate, the motion failed, eight states to three. 
Madison could reasonably infer that the Convention had thereby denied Congress the 
power in question. A few years later he learned he was wrong, and that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause was capacious enough to fill the textual gap–or so Secretary of the 
Treasury Hamilton said, and President Washington finally agreed. 
  Compared to the lengthy debates over representation in June and July, many a 
scholar has wished that the delegates could have spent more time in August and 
September hashing out their ideas of what they expected the new national government, 
if ratified, to do. There are notable differences between the extended speeches of the 
first weeks of deliberation, and the more concise and clipped exchanges of August and  
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early September. Perhaps Madison’s exhaustion as the consensus note-taker explains 
part of the discrepancy, but it is just as plausible to think that the later debates took the 
form they did because the delegates were already deeply united in their notions of the 
expanded powers the Union should exercise. 
 
 
Part II: The Constitution’s Effects 
 
As part I suggested, perhaps the most striking contribution of the Constitution – and one 
too often taken for granted – was the creation of a successful, stable, republican 
government: a national government at once responsive to the interests of citizens, yet 
limited in scope and capable of respecting a wide range of rights. Without this 
accomplishment, the United States is unlikely to have achieved its long-term history of 
economic growth over the next two centuries. Moreover, this form of government was a 
major new invention: a stable republican government over an extended territory as large 
as the United States had never before existed, and many thought it impossible. 
  The Constitution, however, did not create a competitive polity and a competitive 
market economy. Long-term economic growth did not automatically follow. Only in the 
most general sense did the Constitution create “a machine that would go of itself” 
(Kammen 1986). To survive and thrive in an uncertain and ever-changing world, 
Americans had to solve a host of important economic and political problems. This 
required that they devise a variety of new institutions, frameworks, and policies,  
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including: national defense; financial markets; policies with respect to trade, intellectual 
property rights, land, labor, money and bankruptcy; the promotion of economic growth 
through public goods and infrastructure; education; political, economic, and geographic 
expansion; and the one problem that would prove the most difficult to manage, sectional 
conflict. 
  In a real sense, therefore, the Constitution’s most important accomplishment was 
to create a framework within which Americans could cooperate to devise the institutions 
and policies necessary to support economic and political development, resolving various 
threats to cooperative activity as they arose (Mittal 2010, 2008. Also see Landau 1973, 
1969).  
The Constitution’s most general direct economic effect was to create a common 
market and the basis for specialization and exchange that emerged over the next two 
generations. As North (1961) argued, over first generation under the Constitution, 
economic producers in different regions came to specialize in different economic 
activities. The South produced export crops (originally tobacco, rice, and indigo, later 
sugar and especially cotton). The Northeast concentrated on transportation and 
financial services for southern exports (financing of exports, insurance, marketing, and 
the transportation of exports). The Northwest, largely independent at first, increasingly 
specialized in the production of food, shipped south along the waterways and, once the 
transportation infrastructure grew, shipped east along the canals and, later, the railroads 
(Callendar 1902 and Goodrich 1960).   
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  This system of specialization and exchange and the national prosperity it helped 
to produce did not occur on its own. Because economic and political actors are reluctant 
to undertake specialized investments that are vulnerable to political change, a stable 
republican governmental structure underpinned these investments. A host of national 
and especially state policies also supported this accomplishment. As discussed in the 
next section, the investments resulting in regional specialization also required 
complementary action by state governments. The purpose of this essay is to explain the 
institutions that promoted this outcome. 
  We divide the Constitution’s effects into three categories. First, the direct effects: 
making new national policies. Second, the indirect effects: the creation of market-
preserving federalism, fostering competition among the states and allowing them to 
solve a wide range of important political and economic and political problems. And third, 
the forward-looking effects of problem-solving and bargaining. We discuss these in turn. 
 
DIRECT EFFECTS: PROMOTION OF NEW NATIONAL POLICIES 
  Our discussion of the Constitution’s direct effects on national policymaking will be 
brief, in large part because the other contributions to this volume represent extended 
investigations into these effects. 
  We now take American national defense and security for granted, but this is in 
part because the Founders successfully promoted security (Edling 2003, Hendrickson 
2006). As emphasized in part I, providing security proved difficult under the Articles. The 
national government lacked independent and reliable sources of revenue; it could not  
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retire existing debt or fund new debt if the need arose; force the British to honor some 
provisions of the Treaty of Paris; secure the trans-Appalachian domain; and it had no 
means to devise strategies for dealing with various problems with foreign governments, 
such as the closure of British harbors to American merchantmen. 
  The Constitution helped the new national government solve these problems by 
granting the national government adequate revenue sources; and by creating a new 
legislature with sufficient powers to devise new policies and adapt these as 
circumstances changed. 
  Working under the new government, political officials solved a range of other 
important problems that plagued the United States under the Articles. For example, 
under the Articles, internal trade barriers hindered commerce among the states. Several 
clauses of the Constitution, notably the commerce clause and privileges and immunities 
clause, prohibited various types of internal trade barriers by states against the goods 
and services of other states, fostering a common market central to the growth of 
specialization and exchange over the next generation. The national government also 
became the locus of authority of monetary affairs, eliminating another sources of conflict 
(recall, Rhode Island’s inflationary policies whose costs spilled over into other states).  
  The national government also made new policies in a series of areas dealing with 
national public goods. Beginning with his landmark Report on Public Credit (1790), 
Alexander Hamilton helped provide several national public policies necessary to 
underpin financial markets, including the establishment of public credit (including the 
assumption of state revolutionary war debts), the national Mint, and the Bank of the  
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United States (Sylla, this volume). The government also established a national post 
office to improve communications among the states (John 1995). Congress also passed 
a bankruptcy law, an important institution that lowered both the transactions cost of 
removing failed enterprises and the incentives for failed enterprises to seek political 
bailouts. 
 
INDIRECT EFFECTS: A STABLE, CENTRALIZED FEDERAL SYSTEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS   
  As Wallis (2007) reminds us, the Constitution did not create the states, and all 
states had on-going constitutions in 1787. Adoption of the Constitution did not make the 
states impotent or secondary players with respect to policy. Indeed, states remained the 
nexus of economic regulation and the promotion of economic growth. Nor did the 
Constitution provide a rode map for economic and political development.  
  The Constitution did, however, change the environment in which states operated, 
inventing a new form of “centralized federalism” that had never existed (Riker 1987).  
Two important new features of the post-Constitutional environment are relevant for our 
discussion. First, the most important change was creating a stronger national 
government capable of policing the common market. Recall that the national 
government had no such powers to prevent states from acting opportunistically under 
the Articles. The Constitution’s commerce clause prevented states from regulating 
interstate commerce and restricted the federal government to truly national public 
goods, endowing the United States under the new Constitution with one of the largest 
common markets in the world.   
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  Second, the Constitution created the conditions of market-preserving federalism 
(Weingast 1995), matching the economists' prescriptions for fiscal federalism, including 
competition among subnational jurisdictions (Oates 1972, Tiebout 1956). The 
importance of market-preserving federalism is that it unleashed the creative engines of 
state government through competition, all within a common market protected by the 
federal government. 
  Federal systems differ across many dimensions, and only some promote fiscal 
federalism, competition among subnational jurisdictions, and economic development. In 
addition to a hierarchy of governments, market-preserving federalism requires four 
conditions: 
 
•  states have power over policies within their jurisdictions, including taxation and 
the ability to regulate their local economies;  
 
•  states participate in a common market;  
 
•  states face a hard budget constraint;  
 
•  national institutions provide incentives for national officials to honor the rules so 
that federalism is self-enforcing.    
  Satisfying these conditions seems natural in the American context, but few 
modern federal systems meet them (Weingast 1995).
5 Each of these conditions is 
necessary to create effective inter-jurisdictional competition among the states. States 
without policymaking authority lack the power to tailor policies to their local 
                                                           
5For example, modern Germany, Mexico, and Russia fail the policy independence 
condition. Argentina and Brazil fail the hard budget constraint. From 1950 through the 
early 1990s, India failed the policy independence and self-enforcing conditions (with 
respect to the latter, the national government used its authority to take over successful 
opposition state governments).  
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environments, so that they cannot design new policies and programs to compete with 
their rivals. The absence of a common market policed by the national government 
diminishes the competitive pressures of inter-jurisdictional competition and allows states 
to insulate their economy from competitive pressures through internal trade barriers. A 
soft, as opposed to hard, budget constraint allows states to live beyond their financial 
means, often ignoring the effects of inter-jurisdictional competition through the ability to 
support or bailout non-competitive local enterprises. Finally, federal systems that are at 
the discretion of the national government or that fail to prevent that government from 
manipulating the policies and innovations of subnational governments inhibit 
competition, for example when the national government removes governors or 
governments for policies at variance with those of the national government (as has 
occurred at times over the last 25 years in India, Mexico, and Russia). 
  For the early United States, the institutions of market-preserving federalism 
launched the “laboratory of the states.” Federalism fostered state experimentation that 
became critical not only as the competition among the states, but central to the 
economic growth of the early United States.  
  We tend to take the new political stability of the national government for granted. 
But this stability, including the stability of the federal system itself, is necessary for the 
inter-regional specialization and exchange necessary to promote prosperity. When 
states and economic actors feel threatened or believe the system at risk, they are less 
likely to promote and undertake specialized investments that are vulnerable to political 
opportunism from other states or the national government.  
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  The main consequence of the Constitution’s system of market-preserving 
federalism is that states developed many of the important policies promoting economic 
and political development. American states were the frontier of new rights and public 
goods, including franchise (Sokoloff and Engerman 2000), education (Mariscal and 
Sokoloff 2000), party organization (Hofstadter 1969, Holt 1999, North, Wallis, and 
Weingast 2009, ch 6). Consider education. In the United States, the leading liberalizers 
in the 19
th century were not the original thirteen and wealthier colonies, but new ones 
(Mariscal and Sokoloff 2000). This pattern arose in part because newer states 
competed both with each other and with the established states for scarce labor. In order 
to attract labor to the frontier, states liberalized rights and provided public goods, 
including education. By mid-century, “more than 40 percent of school-age population in 
the United States overall was enrolled and nearly 90 percent of white adults were 
literate” (Mariscal and Sokoloff 2000;161).  
  States were also the dominant providers of market-enhancing public goods, 
especially infrastructure investment and banks to help finance the flow of goods and 
crops to markets, a topic we discuss below (Callendar 1902, Goodrich 1960, Wallis and 
Weingast 2005). They were also the primary locus of economic and social regulation 
(as Callendar 1902, Handlin and Handlin 1947, Hartz 1948, Hughes 1977 emphasize in 
different ways). States also controlled the definition and enforcement of most economic 
property rights, including those pertaining to land and slavery. They were also the 
principal creators of open access for corporations, with general incorporation acts 
emerging in the 1840s. Until the Voting Rights Act of 1965, states were also the primary  
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locus of the regulation and administration of elections (subject to the qualification of the 
federal experiments during reconstruction). Finally, states collected most direct taxes 
imposed on citizens (such as the property tax), with the dominant form of national 
revenue being raised through tariffs. 
  With respect to the economy, the national government eclipsed the importance of 
the states only in the mid-twentieth century. Until then, state governments remained the 
dominant force in taxation, economic regulation, the provision of public goods, and the 
management of the economy more broadly.  
 
SOME ILLUSTRATIONS OF STATE PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT   
  States in the early republic were remarkably active in the design of markets and 
the promotion of economic activity. Competition within the framework of market-
preserving federalism fostered both state innovation and imitation of successful 
innovations by others. We illustrate this point with two examples, the evolution of state 
rules regulating banking and with government promotion of economic development 
through infrastructure provision. 
  Banking in the early United States. Developing countries often create 
privileges and rents in the design of new markets (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). 
This is easily seen in banking, where most developing countries restrict the number of 
banks to limit entry and sell bank charters as a means of creating economic rents that 
can be shared among the banks, the government, and specific citizens and firms who 
receive scarce loans (Haber 2005). Because the government has significant interests in  
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banking, exchange of privileged rights often explicitly or implicitly grants the government 
privileged access to loans. Moreover, as Haber (2005) argues, organizing the banking 
sector in this way limits its ability to provide the basic banking functions of an economy, 
notably, mobilizing capital to highest valued users who create new enterprises or seek 
to expand profitable ones. Instead, most loans go to the government, insiders, high 
government officials, and their relatives. An inevitable consequence of this structure, 
therefore, is limited competitiveness of the financial sector and hence limits on the 
degree to which banks help foster long-term economic growth. 
  The United States was no exception to the rule about restricting entry to create 
rents shared among bankers and the government.
6 In 1800, most states used this 
system, including Pennsylvania, whose commercial center of Philadelphia was the 
country’s banking center.  
  States competed in an environment of strong market-preserving federal structure 
throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Consistent with the above 
conditions of market-preserving federalism, states had nearly exclusive regulatory 
control over markets within their borders; they participated in a common market with 
product and factor mobility; and, they faced a hard budget constraint. Moreover, states 
raised virtually all of their own revenue. This structure allowed states to design and 
redesign the rules governing various markets.  
  In the decade following 1800, Massachusetts slowly switched systems. 
Beginning with the monopoly approach, it created one large bank, in which it invested 
                                                           
6Our discussion of banking in the early United States draws on Wallis, Sylla, and Legler 
(1994).  
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heavily, and several smaller banks. The state also imposed a tax on bank capital, which 
worked against the smaller banks: as the majority owner of the large bank, the state 
effectively paid part of its own tax. Over time, the state found it raised more taxes from 
the smaller banks than it did in dividends from the large bank.  
  The state’s fiscal incentives led it to make two changes. It sold its interest in the 
larger bank; and it stopped limiting entry and selling charters. Under the new system, 
Massachusetts combined relatively low taxes on bank capital with more open entry into 
banking. This type of market gave Massachusetts banks a competitive advantage over 
all other U.S. banks. Merchants, enterprises, and transactions funded in Boston – such 
as financing, insuring, marketing, and transporting export crops to Europe – had an 
economic edge over their competitors from other states.  
  Under the new system, Massachusetts’s fiscal incentives differed from those in 
other states, including Pennsylvania. Because a competitive banking sector maximizes 
the size of its tax base, Massachusetts now promoted the growth of a competitive 
banking sector. This system was so successful, that by the early 1830s, Massachusetts 
had more banks and bank capital than any state in the country. It also received over 50 
percent of its revenues from the tax on bank capital, allowing it to reduce the principal 
tax falling on its citizens, the property tax. This was a win-win policy for that state. 
  Based on its competitive banking sector, Massachusetts eclipsed Philadelphia as 
the nation’s banking center. A number of years later, New York also switched fiscal 
systems, emulating Massachusetts, and New York City eclipsed both Boston and 
Philadelphia as the nation’s banking center. Many other states subsequently switched to  
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the system that worked. Had the United States been a centralized federalism, as 
modern Mexico, the national government would have had little incentive to alter the 
original system of limited entry once it was in place.  
  Market-enhancing public goods in the early Republic. Early American 
governments devoted substantial resources to promoting economic development.
7 
Remarkably, state governments, not the national government, played the central role as 
promoters of development. State financial efforts were nearly an order of magnitude 
larger than the federal government’s. Between 1790 and 1860, state and local 
governments spent over $450 million on transportation improvements; in contrast, the 
federal government spent $60 million (Goodrich 1960). 
  With millions of acres of fertile land, much of it virgin soil, the early United States 
was an agrarian economy. Economic growth necessitated investment in both 
transportation infrastructure (roads, canals, and railroads) to open the frontier to 
markets and in banks to finance shipment of goods to markets. State governments 
financed both large-scale internal improvements and financial institutions (Callendar 
1903, Goodrich 1960, Larson 2001). Many of the early projects, such as the Erie Canal, 
proved immensely profitable for the states.  
  Importantly, the state and national governments financed development projects 
in different ways. Congressional politics allowed the national government to finance 
large collections of small projects (such as lighthouses), but not large projects 
concentrated in one state or a small number of states (Wallis and Weingast 2006). 
                                                           
7This discussion draws on Wallis and Weingast (2006).  
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Congressional majorities would not finance large projects benefiting one or a few states 
while drawing taxes from the rest. In principle, the national government could have used 
benefit taxation to solve this problem – raising taxes for the project from the states in 
proportion to their benefits from the projects – but the constitutional provisions for 
national taxation prohibited this. To the extent that the national government financed 
transportation investment, it did so through something-for-everyone programs. In 
contrast, states financed large projects using benefit taxes, assessing property owners 
in proportion to their expected economic gains from the new project. This fiscal 
mechanism allowed them to solve the political problems that plagued the national 
government. 
  This pattern of infrastructure finance reveals the incentives underlying the limits 
on the power of the national government operating in early America. The Constitution 
created a series of political constraints that made it politically impossible for the federal 
government to finance large infrastructure projects. Federal efforts came either in form 
of financing large collections of small projects or formal allocation formulas to distribute 
funds to every state. In short, the national government was politically impotent with 
respect to the provision of the highest valued infrastructure projects. States filled this 
gap. 
  Other illustrations. In the same way, states carried out a host of policies, from 
the form and security of property rights to economic regulation. Moreover, states did not 
limit creation of rights and promotional policies to commerce. As Sokoloff and 
Engerman (2000) demonstrate, suffrage represents an interesting case. Virtually all  
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states at the time of independence had property restrictions on the vote. Universal 
(white) male suffrage tended to emerge on the frontier, as new territories and states 
sought to be attractive to scarce labor. The innovations of these states, in turn, forced 
established states to liberalize and remove their suffrage restrictions. Mariscal and 
Sokoloff (2000) make a similar argument for public education. 
 
ADAPTIVE EFFICIENCY 
  Political stability requires that countries preserve cooperation even as they must 
adapt to changing circumstances, including various crises. Adaptation, in turn, requires 
that the different interests in society have a means of finding and implementing bargains 
that at once solve new problems as they emerge while maintaining cooperation. In 
particular, all parties with the ability to disrupt the constitutional system – for example, 
though secession or a coup – must judge themselves better off under the new bargain 
than disrupting the system. If the constitutional system lacks the ability to make the 
necessary agreements credible, then the bargaining parties will fail to solve their 
problems, not because a solution fails to exist but because they lack the means to find 
and implement this bargain credibly. 
  Following Hayek (1960), North (2005) uses the term “adaptive efficiency” to 
describe a society’s ability to solve problems and react to crises within an existing 
constitutional framework.  Mittal (2010) argues that adaptive efficiency reflects the 
epistemic features of a political system that allow or hinder it to learn and adapt as 
circumstances require (see also Ober 2008). Some countries are more likely to weather  
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crises, even if severe. Other countries, such as those in Latin America and Africa, are 
prone to lapse into disorder and failure in the face of crises.
8  
  Adaptive efficiency is one of the central features of the American constitutional 
system, which has proved relatively adept at allowing Americans to address problems 
and crises (Mittal 2010).
9 This adaptability was not inevitable, however. The unanimity 
requirement under the Articles prevented virtually all adaptation, even in the face of a 
wide range of debilitating cooperation failures and free rider problems. Had the 
Founders merely proposed revisions of the Articles rather than devising a bold, new 
plan to take its place, it is unlikely that much of the adaptation under the Constitution 
would have occurred.  Sequential, piecemeal strengthening of the Articles would have 
undermined the creation of a truly national government capable of addressing a wide 
variety of crises and problems. 
One of the principal concerns of The Federalist is addressing problems inherent 
in preserving constitutional stability in periods of unforeseen change. The essays argue 
that the commitment problem of maintaining an effective federal union is a perpetual 
one in the sense that it recurs in many guises as circumstances change.  Problems of 
state shirking and disunion are dynamic.  To preserve the union given the problems of 
new circumstances and unforeseen change, the government must possess sufficient 
power to address a wide variety of threats to cooperative activity over time. 
                                                           
8Using North, Wallis, and Weingast’s terminology, these differences in performance 
reflect differences in limited access vs. open access societies.  
9 The essays in this volume show how, in a wide range of areas, the American 
Constitutional structure allowed Americans to devise solutions to a range of policy 
problems.  
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Federalist 23-36 argues for the need to create exactly such a capacity to address 
unforeseen circumstances.  Political stability requires an energetic constitution with the 
power to provide for defense and the people's welfare in unanticipated circumstances. 
  Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed upon a calculation 
of existing exigencies, but upon a combination of these with the probable 
exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of human 
affairs. Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to infer the extent 
of any power, proper to be lodged in the national government, from an 
estimate of its immediate necessities. There ought to be a CAPACITY to 
provide for future contingencies as they may happen; and as these are 
illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that capacity 
(Federalist 34).  
 
In designing the Federal Constitution of 1787, America’s constitution-makers 
recognized that improving the quality of legislative deliberation was central to 
maintaining political stability.  When it came to designing a constitution that would last, 
they understood that they could not foresee what the future would bring.  Rather than 
leave the future to future generations, they radically reconsidered the role of legislation 
in society and drew on the latest scientific principles to design a legislative system 
capable of addressing threats that could not be foreseen.   
From the perspective of The Federalist, the legislative process consists of much 
more than a representative forum – it is the nation’s primary means of adaptation, 
especially in the face of crises.  Previous republics tended to conceive of representative 
bodies more narrowly, for example granting them veto power to check the power of 
others who had the power to devise new proposals (such as a nobility in the Italian city-
state republics).
 5 Congress was granted powers sufficient to create new legislation on 
                                                           
5 Montesquieu and Machiavelli consider legislatures primarily as rights-protecting  
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an on-going basis. This modern legislative form is typical of legislative powers in the 
developed world today, but it was novel in 1787. 
In designing a legislative system to respond to a wide variety of threats, 
Federalists relied heavily on the leading political science of the day. Liberal 
incorporation of scientific principles such as competition, redundancy, and diversity in 
the design of the Federal Constitution suggests that Federalists subscribed to a Hume-
ian view of political science that argued people no matter where they are, respond to 
similar incentives similarly. Implicit in their political science was a response to the 
challenges of fortuna and uncertainty as they conceived of it. 
In order for a single legislative process to adapt to problems of increasing 
complexity, government officials needed to have constant incentives to search for and 
create solutions to new and pressing problems that threatened to undermine 
cooperation.  To respond to this challenge, America's constitution-makers designed a 
political system that puts self-interested elected officials in competition with each other.   
Legislative competition is created by concurrent jurisdiction inherent in the 
separation of powers and federal systems (Federalist 32).  Instead of trusting the 
creation of law to a body of enlightened statesmen, the legislative process involves 
inputs from many actors embedded in competition (Federalist 10). Within competitive 
systems officials in the different institutions invest in expertise to avoid exploitation at 
the hands of their competitors. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
institutions, not the adaptive and preference-aggregating forums they were later to 
become.  The Federalist represents a critical transition from a negative, rights-protecting 
approach to lawmaking to a positive understanding of the role of law of in a changing 
world.  
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  Competition ensures that “ambition counteracts ambition” and inhibits 
encroachments on the constitutional rules, whether by departmental, federal, or state 
officials.  But competition in the federal and separation of powers systems was not 
simply created to preserve a set of constitutional limits over time.  A complementary 
goal of intra-governmental competition is to create adaptive efficiency by improving the 
quality of legislative deliberation and the ability of legislature to solve problems as they 
arise (Mittal 2008).  Overlap (or redundancy) in the jurisdiction of these branches 
creates competitive pressures among them.  Competition, in turn, forces each branch 
not only to check the others but to invest in skills and knowledge; competition is also an 
impetus behind institutional change. By increasing the stock and quality of institutional 
knowledge (Mokyr 2005), competition in the legislative process improves adaptive 
efficiency. 
In order to respond effectively to unanticipated circumstances, legislative actors 
need more than political incentives to create legislation that will prove effective in 
restoring cooperation.  They also need the ability to create such legislation.  The 
Federalist framework for adaptive efficiency created a legislative process that restores 
and reinforces cooperative activity in the face of problems and crises by aggregating, 
aligning, and codifying knowledge
6  
With regard to aggregation, American constitution-makers sought to ensure that 
the system as whole would locate effective solutions to new problems.  The Federalists 
sought to widen the epistemic base of government by creating many players with 
                                                           
6 Focusing on Ancient Athens, Ober (2008) articulates the importance of institutions for 
aggregating, aligning, and codifying knowledge in the success of democratic regimes.  
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competitive interests in finding legislative solutions.  Under the Articles, the unicameral 
Congress was the sole legislative body.  Under the Federal Constitution, two branches 
of the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary each have a role in creating federal 
legislation.  
In addition to creating many problem-solvers in government, the Constitution 
created different problem-solvers. Page (2008) uses mathematical modeling to show 
how groups that display a range of perspectives outperform groups of like-minded 
experts.  He argues that diverse groups of people bring to organizations more and 
different ways of seeing a problem and, thus, faster and better ways of solving it.
7 Each 
branch of the federal government and every state has a distinct culture, experiences 
and knowledge, and approach to deliberation.  The electoral system also contributes to 
diversity of approach by introducing new representatives with different perspectives into 
the lawmaking process (Federalist 62).  
In addition to aggregating knowledge and producing legislative solutions it is also 
critical that the central government coordinate on a legislative solution suited to the 
problem.  In this context, the legislative process is the principal means of aligning a 
diverse population and set of political institutions on a particular solution to a problem.  
The required consent of several legislative bodies promoted alignment on moderate 
proposals.  Extreme legislation would pass only in periods with unusual levels of 
consensus. 
                                                           
7 Ober (2008) argues that bringing together people with different knowledge and 
perspectives was part of ancient Athens’s success.  
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Finally, adaptive efficiency requires that solutions to new problems be codified 
and disseminated quickly.  Preserving political stability in a crisis requires that 
knowledge of the legislative solution be quickly and efficiently dispersed throughout 
society. Without access to new information, each American state will operate on 
outdated information – leading to the familiar story of miscalculation, crisis, and 
disorder.  American approaches to codification stem from thoughtful analysis of the 
Articles of Confederation.  Uniformity and clarity in state legislation on issues was a 
direct response to Madison’s concern with the “multiplicity, mutability, and injustice” of 
state law. Issues of naturalization, trade, and bankruptcy required greater uniformity of 
treatment and procedure than could be obtained from independent state action. 
Our earliest political leaders understood that their work in 1787 would not be 
perfect (Federalist 85). While a wide variety of threats to cooperative activity could be 
addressed through legislation, they recognized some situations would require changes 
to the constitutional framework.  With the bitter memory of the Articles’ unanimity 
requirement for amendment fresh in their minds, the Federalists ensured that 
amendment of the Federal Constitution could be achieved with greater ease. 
Turning to the specifics of adaptation, we have already discussed several ways 
in which the American system proved adaptive. With respect to western expansion, the 
American Constitutional framework proved adaptive. The mechanisms for settling 
western lands and the rules for supervising these units ensured that they would be self-
constituting units and that they would be brought into the union on the same terms as 
existing states (see Grubb, this volume). This framework limited the potential rent- 
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extraction from existing states and ensured that the new states would enjoy the same 
incentives possessed by existing states created by the market-preserving federalism 
environment. As new opportunities arose for expansion, the new nation took advantage 
of them, such as in the Louisiana Purchase and its settlement.  
With respect to financial institutions, the national government promoted aspects 
of national capital markets, particularly sound public credit and a national bank. 
Federalism, especially competition among jurisdictions, prompted states to address a 
range of problems as a means of promoting a healthy economy and out-competing 
rivals for scarce capital and labor and for the means of economic prosperity. Notable 
examples include the banking system and infrastructure to promote economic 
development. This system was not automatic, however, and often Americans faced 
seemingly intractable problems.  
  The most enduring and difficult problem that would episodically trouble 
Americans over their first century concerned sectional conflict, particularly over slavery. 
In the nineteenth century, the United States faced five sectional crises, conflicts 
between Northerners and Southerners over the nature of the Constitution and the future 
of the republic. In each crisis, the future of the country was at risk, and one – the fourth 
– resulted in a devastating Civil War when each of the proposed compromises of 1861 
failed. With considerable difficulty, Americans solved the other four crises. Those in 
1820, 1833, 1850, and 1877, resulted in adaptation of the constitutional bargain through 
an official Compromise, congressional acts that typically resolved the immediate issue 
of the crisis but also set rules governing future policies.  
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  None of these compromises officially amended the Constitution. Yet each of the 
four compromises changed the rules of the political game, resulting in what Eskridge 
and Ferejohn (2001) call “super-statutes.” These statutes represent more than ordinary 
legislation and can therefore be thought of as small “c” constitutional changes, changes 
in the structure of the bargain underlying the political system.  
  From the beginning of the republic, Americans had to confront the issue of 
whether one section, North or South, would gain the ability to dominate the national 
government. This issue underlay each of the five nineteenth century crises. Americans 
constructed the Constitution to balance the interests of the sections so that neither 
would dominate (Ellis 2000, Finkleman 1996, Rakove 1996). In particular, it provided a 
range of credible commitments to protect slavery, including federalism’s decentralization 
of property rights to states, and the three-fifths clause granting Southerners additional 
representation in Congress based on their slaves.  
  Perhaps the most important credible commitment to protect slavery was the 
balance rule, the idea that the country would maintain an equal number of free and 
slave states (Weingast 1998, 2002). Sectional balance provided each section with a 
veto over national policymaking through equal representation in the Senate; in 
particular, it granted Southerners the ability to veto any national legislation over slavery. 
Sectional balance first emerged with the admission of Kentucky (1792) and Tennessee 
(1796), bringing each section’s delegation up to eight states. Americans maintained this 
balance through 1850 with the lone admission of California. Attempts to restore balance 
over the next decade (for example, the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 and the 1858  
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attempt to admit Kansas as a slave state under so-called Lecompton constitution mired 
in allegations of voter fraud) added to the crisis. 
  A critical feature of sectional balance as a major institutional protection for 
slavery is that it required the two sections to grow in parallel, in turn requiring that each 
section have sufficient territory within which to expand. Three of the four antebellum 
crises emerged in moments when one section potentially had an edge, as in 1819-20, 
1846-50, and 1854-61.   
  As an example, consider the Compromise of 1820. The immediate concern in the 
1819 controversy over Missouri was whether to admit Missouri as a slave state. With no 
obvious free territory looming in the wings, this admission would have tipped the 
balance in favor of the South, and Northerners reacted in the House of Representatives 
where they had a majority by admitting Missouri subject to conditions of gradual 
emancipation of all slaves. Southerners used their equal representation in the Senate to 
prevent this provision from becoming law, and a crisis ensued.  
  The Compromise of 1820 resolved the crisis on three different levels. First, it 
admitted Maine (broken off from Massachusetts) as a free state to balance the 
admission of Missouri, maintaining sectional balance. Second, it divided the remaining 
territories between free and slave, removing ambiguity as to their status and the 
uncertainty over the future disposition of those territories and the resulting states. Third, 
the Compromise made explicit the balance rule for the future admission in states. For 
the next three decades, states were admitted in pairs (Arkansas and Michigan in the 
mid-1830s; and Florida, Texas, Iowa, and Wisconsin in the mid-1840s). In similar ways,  
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Congress passed compromises in 1833 and 1850 to resolve crises over sectional 
issues.  
  In all four antebellum crises, secession and the potential failure of American 
Constitution and democracy were live issues, as demonstrated by the secession winter 
of 1860-61 and following Civil War. American constitutional stability, therefore, rested on 
the ability of Americans to resolve their differences and to provide solutions to new 
problems as they arose. 
  Thinking broadly to include federalism and the engine of competition among the 
states, the Constitution created a framework within which Americans could resolve most 
of their problems, including the most vexing one of slavery and the balance between the 
two sections within the Union. Although this framework failed to create a solution in 
1861, the constitutional system did allow Americans to resolve their conflicts for three 
generations prior to the Civil War. This framework provided the basis for on-going 
cooperation between the section and to foster specialization and exchange of a growing 
economy. In addition, twenty-five years after the start of the Civil War, Southern states 
had been readmitted on roughly the same terms as they had left, with the major change 






The most striking contribution of the Constitution – and one too often taken for granted – 
was the creation of a successful, stable, republican government capable of adapting to 
the wide variety of changes  future generations would face. Without this 
accomplishment, the United States is unlikely to have achieved its long-term history of 
sustained economic growth. In contrast to the Articles, which provided incentives for 
states to shirk their responsibilities, the Constitution created a system in which 
Americans cooperated to solve a range of problems.  
  In the Constitution's first decade, new policies addressed a range of problems, 
most notably the policy failures under the Articles: providing security for the new nation; 
addressing a wide range of problems of public finance, including raising sufficient 
revenue, retiring existing debt, and creating the basis for new debt when needed; 
asserting control over the frontier; trade policies aimed at the flooding of foreign goods 
on the American markets and the closing of foreign ports to American shipping; 
enforcing provisions of the Treaty of Paris; and limiting a range of problems among the 
states, such as internal trade barriers. 
  The Constitution also provided the means and incentives for Americans to solve 
new problems as they arose. Many solutions occurred directly through congressional 
policymaking. We illustrated this point with the various compromises aimed at solving 
the episodic problems that arose around slavery, the territories, and westward 
expansion. The Constitution also created indirect incentives for Americans to solve their 
problems through the market-preserving federalism. States not only had incentives to 
create strong systems of property and other rights as a means of competing against  
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neighboring states, but to adapt their policies and institutions as circumstances 
changed. With respect to banks, for example, states originally created a system of local 
monopolies; but gradually, following the innovations in Massachusetts, states moved to 
a system of competitive banking. By the Civil War the United States had more banks 
than any other economy. Competition among the frontier territories and states for 
scarce capital and especially labor led them to expand political rights and education, 
resulting in universal enfranchisement, at least for white males. 
  The result was one of the biggest common markets in the world, largely free of 
government regulation. In combination, the national and state governments provided a 
secure environment for investment with a relative absence of political opportunism or 
threat of expropriation. Significant specialization and exchange resulted, producing long-
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